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Abstract In his The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and its Limits 
Christiano defends an idea that democracy has authority because it realizes public 
equality. According to Christiano, for realization of public equality there is no need 
for any restriction on the content of reasons we offer each other to justify laws and 
policies. In this paper I try to show that there are good reasons to think that bound-
aries of public reason can more deeply realize public equality in plural society and I 
also try to defend this view from some criticisms given by Christiano in his book.
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It is a great privilege to have the op-
portunity to discuss Thomas Christiano’s 
The Constitution of Equality: Democratic 
Authority and its Limits.1 It is certainly 
one of the most important theoretical 
accounts of democracy. But, it is not 
only a contribution to democratic theo-
ry, it is also a powerful defense of liberal 
–democracy and also a certain form of 
the welfare state. Christiano gives a very 
sophisticated account not only of demo-
cratic rights, but also of liberal rights 
and social minimum. The aim of my 
discussion is to try to emphasize certain 
points of his theory from an alternative 
approach to liberal democracy – politi-
1 Page references in parentheses refer to this 
book. 
cal liberalism. More particularly, from 
the central idea of political liberalism 
and its idea of public reason. I must 
apologize in advance that it would surely 
be an oversimplification of Christiano’s 
account, which is very sophisticated and 
nuanced. I try first to find shared ground 
between Christiano’s basic ideas and the 
Rawlsian idea of public reason. I then 
focus on providing some reasons for ac-
cepting the idea of public reason as a 
guideline in democratic deliberation, 
something which Christiano refutes. But, 
I try to present the case for public reason 
on the grounds of the notion of political 
community and what role deliberation, 
constrained by public reason, can play in 
constituting a political community in 
the circumstances of pluralism.
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The first problem that proponents of 
Rawlsian public reason can raise against 
Christiano’s account of democracy and 
justice is that he grounds the intrinsic 
equality of human beings in the notion 
of dignity. Namely, if the purpose of so-
ciety is to establish justice among per-
sons then we must have a certain account 
of justice. For Christiano, justice is 
grounded in the equal dignity of per-
sons, therefore it “demands that the 
well-being of each person be advanced 
equally or at least that all persons have 
available to them equal basic conditions 
for advancing their well-being” (4). Po-
litical liberals can say that dignity is phil-
osophically too burdened a concept to 
be the foundational idea of justice in 
plural societies. We can imagine other 
plausible candidates for the foundation 
of justice, for example, pleasure. Political 
liberals can say that if we should apply 
the principle of tolerance to philosophy 
itself, as Rawls famously stated, than we 
cannot ground our account of justice in 
a philosophically controversial notion 
because it will be sectarian. The objec-
tion that political liberals can raise is not 
simply that an account of justice refers to 
some philosophically controversial con-
cept like dignity. There will be many dif-
ferent grounds of justice or justifications 
of principles of justice and luckily they 
will converge. The problem to which 
political liberals can point to is that a 
stronger claim is made – that the only 
way to ground justice is in the value of 
dignity. In that case it seems that such an 
account of justice cannot be accepted by 
adherents to other comprehensive ethi-
cal views even though they could accept 
the content of the principles of justice, 
but on different grounds. We would 
then, enter into a foundational disagree-
ment which, according to political liber-
als, is not appropriate for political dis-
cussion in plural democracies. This 
would imply that in political discussion, 
when discussing what is legal or illegal, 
we should base our views on what is in-
trinsically valuable to human life by al-
ready having a correct account of what 
that is. In this case, life lived according to 
the value of dignity.
I do not think that this can serve as a 
worthy objection. Dignity, how Chris-
tiano employs the term, is not some kind 
of supreme value that must be promot-
ed, but it is a status which ought to be 
honored. It is thus a status of equal dig-
nity that is conferred on every human 
being on the basis of a certain capacity. 
This capacity is in Christiano’s terms the 
value of humanity. Christiano writes, 
“The humanity of a person is that per-
son’s capacity to recognize, appreciate, 
engage with, harmonize with and pro-
duce intrinsic goods” (14). Humanity 
must also not be considered as the 
ground of all value, it just “connects hu-
man beings with the realm of value in 
the world” (14). It says, if I understand it 
correctly, that even if important part of 
humanity is the production of values in 
the world it does not mean that human-
ity is the source of all values. So, a reli-
gious person can believe that god is the 
source of values, but also accept human-
ity as a distinct way human beings en-
gage with these values. Because human 
beings have this capacity they are “a kind 
of authority in the realm of value” (15). 
This authority gives them a special status 
in the world and sacrificing them for the 
sake of other intrinsic values implies a 
failure to acknowledge their status, a 
failure to acknowledge their equal digni-
ty as beings who poses this capacity. It 
seems to me that there is nothing con-
troversial in grounding dignity in such a 
capacity. If political liberals still hold 
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that this is controversial then they also 
seem to have a problem of their own. 
Namely, many of them hold that the ba-
sis of equality is the moral capacity for 
the conception of good, which is the 
“capacity to form, revise and rationally 
pursue a conception of one’s rational 
advantage of good” (Rawls, 1996, 19).2 
Thus, if Christiano’s grounding of equal-
ity in dignity or humanity is controver-
sial or sectarian then grounding equality 
in the moral capacity for the conception 
of good is also sectarian. As a matter of 
fact, it was disputed by some philoso-
phers that it assumes that one’s concep-
tion of good carries normative force 
only if it has been the product of 
self-conscious, deliberate choice.3 But, 
this critique is wrong because what 
grounding equality in the moral capacity 
for good assumes is just what it says – we 
all have a capacity to engage with intrin-
sic goods and formulate our conception 
of a good life around these goods. It is 
not saying what these intrinsic goods are 
– autonomous life or life according to 
custom and tradition, for example. In 
the same sense, Christiano can answer 
potential objections to his notion of hu-
manity, that it would be sectarian if he 
assumed or claimed that there is a par-
ticular specification of the content of in-
trinsic goods with which persons en-
gage. Thus, it seems to me that Chris-
tiano’s notion of humanity and Rawls’s 
notion of the moral capacity of the con-
ception for good are quite similar in 
their objective and also in their answer 
2 There are of course two moral powers Rawls 
mentions. The other moral power is a capac-
ity to understand, to apply, and to act from 
the public conception of justice.
3 For example by J. Donald Moon (Moon, 1993, 
57).
to possible critics. They are both uncon-
troversial because without them persons 
would not be able to have a conception 
of a good life, and also it is up to them to 
choose in what way they will engage 
with intrinsic goods, what these goods 
will be and how they will change their 
engagement with intrinsic goods as they 
live their lives. The way we engage with 
intrinsic goods and how successful we 
are in realizing them in our lives defines 
our well-being. Furthermore, equality as 
a basic principle of justice demands that 
each person’s well-being should be ad-
vanced. But, if what I said so far makes 
sense, than it seems to me that it implies 
something to which I will return to in 
the discussion below, and that is the pri-
ority of the free exercise of reason. If our 
well-being is in important part defined 
by the way we engage with intrinsic 
goods, and it would certainly be overly 
paternalistic to say which intrinsic goods 
and which kind of engagement is appro-
priate, then it is left to our reason to fig-
ure this out. In a sense, the free exercise 
of reason must be respected even if we, 
through exercising it, come to different 
conclusions and accept a doctrine that 
does not give priority to the free exercise 
of reason.
The similarities between Christiano 
and political liberalism go further be-
cause they both strive for a general con-
ception of liberal justice that can be used 
to arrange institutions. Political liberals 
accept the liberal principle of legitimacy: 
“Our exercise of political power is fully 
proper only when it is exercised in ac-
cordance with a constitution the essen-
tials of which all citizens as free and 
equal may reasonably be expected to in-
dorse in the light of principles and ideal 
acceptable to their common human rea-
son (Rawls, 1996, 131). Thus, it says that 
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constitutional essentials must be accept-
able to common human reason. Consti-
tutional essentials only give us a frame-
work within which we should exercise 
our political power in democratic poli-
tics. And we can interpret this to mean 
that this framework must be built only 
by public reason. Within this framework 
we can exercise our political power 
without being constrained by the 
boundaries of public reason, as long as 
this exercise is in accordance with this 
framework. The content of this frame-
work is the general liberal conception of 
justice, which is specified by three prin-
ciples – first, it assigns citizens certain 
basic rights and liberties; second, it as-
signs those rights and liberties special 
priority; and, third, it provides citizens 
with adequate, all purpose means to 
make use of those rights and liberties 
(Ibid, xlviii-xlix). Certainly, citizens will 
disagree about which specific concep-
tion of liberal justice satisfies these gen-
eral principles, and they will bring their 
laws and policies in accordance with the 
constraints these principles place. Also, 
even though these principles must be 
acceptable to common human reason, 
the justification of laws and policies 
within the framework of these principles 
does not have to be justified only by rea-
sons acceptable to all, but it can instead 
be justified on more perfectionist rea-
sons that are part of some particular set 
of values. Of course as long as it does not 
undermine one’s exercise of basic rights 
and liberties.
It seems to me that Christiano’s ac-
count of democracy can be interpreted 
along similar lines. The guiding princi-
ple of justice, according to Christiano is 
the principle of the equal advancement 
of interests. The permanent feature of 
society is that there will always be a con-
flict of interests and disagreements about 
the common good and justice. Thus, the 
realization of justice or the equal ad-
vancement of interests in such circum-
stances must be the realization of the 
principle of public equality. It means 
that each citizen can see that she is treat-
ed as equal even though there is a per-
manent disagreement over laws and 
policies. Every citizen can see that she is 
treated according to the principle of 
public equality if their disagreements are 
resolved through democratic decision- 
making for which every citizen must 
have equal democratic rights. Also, in 
order to be able to equally advance their 
interests every citizen must have equal 
basic liberal rights such as freedom of 
consciousness, freedom of expression, 
freedom of association and freedom of 
pursuits. Furthermore, every citizen 
must have a guaranteed minimum of 
economic resources that enables her to 
exercise and enjoy these rights. Ground-
ing all of these rights in the same princi-
ple – the principle of public equality – 
implies that our exercise of political 
power through democratic decision- 
mak ing cannot violate the basic liberal 
or economic rights of some portion of 
citizens or their democratic rights by, for 
example, disenfranchising them. Chris-
tiano even gives the role to a certain ju-
diciary body, such as a high court, to 
strike down legislation if it violates such 
rights because it is the violation of public 
equality. Thus, even though the demo-
cratic assembly, where we exercise our 
democratic rights, has authority, this 
authority is constrained by public equal-
ity. Christiano is clear that “for a state to 
be authoritative, it must be reasonably 
just either in the substance of its laws or 
in the process by which it makes those 
laws” (236). Realizing public equality 
through these three sets of rights (demo-
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cratic, liberal and economic) ensures 
that the state will be reasonably just, at 
least to a certain minimum. Of course, 
citizens will disagree on more substan-
tive conceptions of justice but this mini-
mal requirement of justice should be 
“the point in the theory where disagree-
ment no longer has the power to legiti-
mate an outcome of collective deci-
sion-making” (269). Those who reject 
public equality or its implications for 
democracy “should know better and the 
society is not required to respect these 
antiegalitarian judgments in the sense 
that it must accept as legitimate deci-
sions that are grounded in this antiegali-
tarian judgment” (269). I believe we can 
say that the principle of public equality is 
an ideal acceptable to common human 
reason.4 And I believe we can say that 
the principle of public equality demands 
all three features of the general liberal 
conception of justice – it requires assign-
ing basic democratic and liberal rights, 
gives them priority over other consider-
ations that can occur in democratic de-
cision-making, and it also provides all 
purpose means to make use of those 
rights and liberties in the form of an eco-
nomic minimum. And, also within this 
framework citizens can enjoy wide dem-
ocratic discretion in reaching democrat-
ic decisions by appealing to different 
ideas of the common good and specific 
conceptions of justice which are com-
patible with the general conception of 
liberal justice. It seems to me that we can 
4 I believe this is clear because in the back-
ground of principle of public equality are 
our fundamental interests we have inde-
pendently of our particular understanding 
of good. These interests are: interest in cor-
recting for cognitive bias; interest at being at 
home in the world; interest in being treated 
as a person with equal moral standing 
among one’s fellow citizens (60 – 63).  
say that public reason can take a form of 
public equality. We can say that this is 
public reason as public equality. What 
can seem to be the most problematic as-
pect of this interpretation is that the 
second requirement – giving special 
priority to rights – is not fully compati-
ble with a whole approach of Christiano’s 
project, given that he does not insist on 
such a clear difference between the polit-
ical and the comprehensive conceptions 
of justice as political liberals do. Namely, 
it can imply that only special kind of 
reasons, those backed by the political 
values on which rights are based, can 
play a justificatory role in democratic 
assembly. This is the view I will defend 
below, but this is not the sole plausible 
interpretation of public reason. We can 
say that we only give special priority to 
rights when certain political issues are 
put and formulated in the terms of basic 
rights. It seems clear to me that Chris-
tiano accepts this position. He does not 
only say that we all have formally equal 
liberal rights, but that we should not be 
unduly burdened in exercising these 
rights even if it is for good reason. “For 
example, in many cases” Christiano ex-
plains “one may not require the Catholic 
Church in the United States to comply 
with laws banning discrimination on the 
basis of sex even though discrimination 
on the basis of sex is thought to be wrong 
and is banned in the case of many eco-
nomic activities” (134). Or for example, 
urban planning or zoning are usually 
under the discretion of local govern-
ment decision-making. They can bring 
regulations under which some places of 
public worship cannot be built or ruled 
out altogether. But, if this decision is 
challenged by referring to the freedom 
of religion than this right has priority 
and it cannot be overridden by certain 
perfectionist or esthetic reasons even if 
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those reasons would be perfectly fine if 
not challenged by liberal right.5 I believe 
Christiano would agree that our demo-
cratic rights, liberal rights and demo-
cratic procedures should be in the con-
stitution.6 Thus, it seems to me that our 
exercise of political power when in ac-
cordance with the constitution is our 
exercise of political power that is in ac-
cordance with the principle of public 
equality. One possible problem is the 
provision of an economic minimum. 
The United States, for example, does not 
have any social rights in its constitution, 
but most other well-established democ-
racies contain such rights in their consti-
tutions. So, I take it that even a certain 
minimum of economic and material 
rights should be in the constitution.
But, according to Christiano, public 
equality stops at this level. This is the last 
point where, according to Christiano, 
equality can be public. To go further it 
would enter into the domain of disagree-
ments on controversial conceptions of 
justice and equality, disagreements that 
should be subject of democratic deci-
sion-making. The outcomes of demo-
cratic decision-making and the reasons 
we give for our political proposals do not 
have to satisfy the same requirement of 
publicity as the principle of public equal-
ity does. Thus, the realization of public 
equality does not require any constraint 
on our reason giving or justification for 
proposals. The liberal principle of legiti-
5 At least, this is how I understand Christiano 
when he says that „if a zoning regulation 
rules out public places of worship, without 
being explicitly designed to rule them out, 
such a regulation seems to be a violation of 
freedom of religion as well“ (139). 
6 It does not have to be written constitution 
but that it has place that rights and demo-
cratic procedures have in written constitu-
tions. 
macy on the interpretation given above 
also does not go that far, but stops at the 
same level as public equality. Public 
equality realized at that level also 
grounds democratic authority. Demo-
cratic decision-making embodied in a 
democratic assembly has the authority 
because it realizes the principle of public 
equality. Outcomes of such decision-
mak ing do not have to fully satisfy jus-
tice to be authoritative. They can be less 
just than one’s favorite conception of 
substantive justice would demand, but 
democratic assembly still has the moral 
power to demand obedience from a citi-
zen and the citizen still has the moral 
obligaion to obey the law. In that sense 
citizens have content-independent rea-
sons to obey democratic decisions. Con-
tent-dependency comes into light only 
in cases when these decisions violate 
those rights that realize public equality 
or, as we said above, when they violate 
the general liberal conception of justice. 
Thus, a democratic assembly that satis-
fies public equality has the authority as a 
right to rule that “includes the liberty on 
the part of the authority to make deci-
sions as it sees fit and it includes a power 
to impose duties on citizens” (241). Citi-
zens have a moral duty to obey the dem-
ocratic assembly because this political 
institution embodies public equality. 
This gives inherent authority to demo-
cratic assembly, which is different from 
instrumental authority that government 
agencies have. In a democracy govern-
ment agencies and courts derive their 
authority from finding ways of specify-
ing and achieving the aims of democrat-
ic assembly.
But, what seems important to me is 
what this inherent authority, according 
to Christiano, adds to what was previ-
ously considered to be merely a political 
aggregate of individuals who by exercis-
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ing their liberal rights associate with 
like-minded others and make narrow 
moral communities based on their more 
particular values. Inherent authority has 
important role in constituting one polit-
ical community. As Christiano says, it 
“describe[s] a kind of ideal of political 
community” (242). Reason for this is 
that it is “grounded in a moral relation-
ship between the parties that goes be-
yond the fact that they are fellow human 
beings…The exercise of political power 
is founded in a moral relationship be-
tween moral persons that recognizes 
and affirms the moral personality of 
each citizen” (242).
This notion of community and mor-
al relationship is particularly important 
for the possible argument that the idea 
of public reason can serve as a constraint 
on the appropriate political argument 
within political deliberation and not 
only as an idea of public equality. It can 
refer to a more common notion of how 
political liberals specify the idea of pub-
lic reason – as a constraint on legitimate 
reasons for political decisions. But, let’s 
first see what we can learn about politi-
cal community from Christiano’s usage 
of the notion of inherent authority as a 
right to rule. He makes it clear that “so-
ciety ruled by an authority that has the 
right to rule is an ideal of a moral com-
munity, the other types of authority are 
lesser forms of morally ideal political 
community” (243). Other types of au-
thority such as instrumental authority 
cannot be the core ideal of a political 
community. Our moral relationship, 
which is constitutive of community, 
stems out of our duty to respect the prin-
ciple of public equality, but only through 
its embodiment in democratic assembly. 
Thus, it is not that our duty is simply 
grounded in public equality and then 
according to some true standard of pub-
lic equality someone can make decisions 
in our name and demand our obedience 
by simply saying that we owe duty to 
these laws because we already have a 
duty to act according to the principle of 
public equality. Someone who would do 
that would place himself “and his judg-
ment above that of others in a way that a 
parent places her judgment above that of 
an infant or a god places its judgment 
over that of human being” (235). In 
reaching our political decisions we must 
take care of what others think and more 
particularly what they say. Thus, if in-
herent authority is grounded in public 
equality and it is constitutive of the ideal 
of moral community, then deliberation 
is also constitutive of moral community. 
In that sense deliberation is within the 
reach of the principle of public equality. 
We can see this clearly when Christiano 
argues against equal lotteries or another 
random choosing device that respects 
fairness for choosing among political 
proposals. Democracy is better than 
such devices because it realizes equality 
more adequately than lotteries. Thus, the 
point is that in the model of lotteries, 
even though it is fair, equality is satisfied 
only at the moment before the lottery, 
and after that moment there is no fur-
ther reach of equality. In an ordinary 
democracy equality extends to voting, 
campaigning, representing, and of course 
to the process of democratic delibe-
ration. Democratic authority that is 
grounded in public equality includes 
deliberation because we must extend 
public equality as far as it can reach. 
Thus, political community is constituted 
by the inherent authority of democratic 
assembly that features democratic delib-
eration as a necessary component. This 
is important if we are going to conceptu-
alize community not in terms of the 
same culture or identity, which is prob-
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lematic because of deep disagreements 
on these issues, but in terms of common 
institutions and our relationship within 
these institutions. We can say that dem-
ocratic deliberation shapes our relation-
ship within shared political institutions. 
In a sense this implies that equality real-
ized in our deliberation constitutes the 
nature of our political relationship mak-
ing it a relationship of equals.
I do think that equality realized in 
deliberation defines and constitutes our 
moral relationship as members of one 
community, but I am not sure that the 
purely distributive account of equality 
that Christiano offers can fulfill the role 
that deliberation in democratic assem-
bly is supposed to provide. The way I 
understand Christiano, equality is real-
ized in the equal distribution of rights as 
a means of realizing that our fundamen-
tal interests should be equally respected. 
And this is also why deliberation is an 
indispensable part of democracy. Even 
when he discusses equality within delib-
eration Christiano still speaks about 
distribution: “the distribution of cogni-
tive conditions for the effective exercise 
of citizenship, the distribution of oppor-
tunities for influencing the agenda of 
collective decision-making, and equality 
of respect that citizens hold for each oth-
er” (197). The first two considerations 
argue in favor of the availability of infor-
mation and political skills, well designed 
institutions for civic participation within 
a representative democratic system, and 
policies that remove the power of money 
from political decision-making. The 
third consideration is different and it 
depends on the attitudes of persons to-
ward each other, I will discuss that be-
low. But, I have a worry that a purely 
distributive approach to equality cannot 
explain our relationship as inherently 
moral and give account of the ideal po-
litical community. All these aspects can 
be supervised by some imagined politi-
cal body that safeguards our rights if our 
political outcomes violate democratic 
rights and procedures, liberal rights and 
provision of an economic minimum, 
and which prescribes policies that pro-
vide the necessary means to exercise ef-
fectively our citizenship and the egalitar-
ian public financing of parties. Still our 
political behavior can be strategic within 
these guarded limits. Should we consid-
er any group of persons constrained in 
this way to constitute a community by 
themselves and their engagement with 
each other as moral engagement? Would 
we not also question how they make de-
cisions and on what grounds? It seems to 
me that there must be some set of values 
that defines community and on which 
persons within that community act so 
we can say that their engagement with 
each other is a moral relationship. Of 
course, Christiano is right that we can-
not have any specification of distributive 
equality that goes further into our polit-
ical decision-making because we will 
plausibly disagree on it. I do, however, 
believe that equality, not in its distribu-
tive but in its relational aspect can be 
realized in the content of deliberation 
and that this also defines how we relate 
to each other.
The overall picture I have in mind is 
that when we justify institutions de-
signed to promote democratic delibera-
tion in plural societies we should appeal 
only to distributional equality, but when 
we give account of how this deliberation 
should be practiced to be the basis of 
community then we appeal to the rela-
tional aspect of equality. I believe that 
the idea of public reason as a constraint 
of reasons in our democratic delibera-
tion provides this relational aspect of 
equality. As Rawls says, public reason 
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changes the nature of our political rela-
tionship.7 In this interpretation, public 
reason it is not only a standard by which 
we evaluate procedures, laws and poli-
cies but, and with equal importance, also 
a set of guidelines as to how we should 
exercise our political power. More spe-
cifically, it can be seen as a guide on how 
to practice our deliberation. It is the 
practice that demands that we consider 
each other as equals beyond having 
equal rights with which we enter into the 
political domain. But, what is the con-
tent of this practice of equality? Schef-
fler, for example, says that in “a relation-
ship that is conducted on a footing of 
equality, each person accepts that the 
other person’s equally important inter-
ests should play equally significant role 
in influencing decisions made within the 
context of relationship” (Scheffler, 2015, 
25). He calls this requirement “the egali-
tarian deliberative constrai” (ibid.). The 
important thing is that Scheffler applies 
egalitarian deliberative constraint to pri-
vate and political relationships. In pri-
vate relationships it is easier to know 
what the interests of the other party are, 
and it is easier to weigh them in mutual 
discussion. Also, it is easier to see which 
decisions fall within the context of a re-
lationship and which decisions should 
be externalized. If decisions are exter-
nalized then parties do not have to take 
the interests of others in the same way as 
they do when decisions fall within the 
context of a relationship. But, neverthe-
less, it is not so hard to see how it can be 
applied to a political relationship. Deci-
sions that are within our core liberal 
rights are decisions that are outside the 
7 Rawls writes that “the role of criterion of 
reciprocity as specified by public reason is to 
specify the nature of the political relation in 
a constitutional democratic regime as one of 
civic friendship” (Rawls, 1996, li).
context of a political relationship, while 
decisions that are about our common 
political world are within this context. 
The context of a political relationship 
with which we are interested in here is a 
context where we as citizens deliberate 
not on any kind of decisions but on 
binding decisions. Decisions being made 
within this context are ones that we as 
citizens must obey and we can be sanc-
tioned if we do not obey them. Of 
course, an additional element is that 
outcomes must be within the framework 
of liberal justice. Thus, interests that 
should be equally important are those 
interests that are compatible with liberal 
justice. More specifically, these are inter-
ests in realizing the values of liberal jus-
tice. It is possible that many persons will 
feel a strong attachment to values from 
their narrower moral communities, but 
these values are outside the context of 
our relationship as citizens. They are 
within the context of their associations. 
When I speak of the values of liberal jus-
tice I have in mind values such as free-
dom, equality, fairness, cooperation and 
fact of burdens of judgments.8 Also, 
saying that interests in these values 
should play an equally significant role 
means that they should be weighed 
against each other and that interests in 
values that are outside of this set cannot 
outweigh these values. I believe these 
values are compatible with public equal-
ity in the sense that I do not see how a 
citizen who adheres to the principle of 
public equality can propose political 
outcomes that will be in contrast with 
these values. This simply says that a citi-
zen who wholeheartedly adheres to the 
idea that the distribution of rights and 
the design of procedures must treat 
8  This idea is more fully elaborated by Jona-
than Quong in Quong (2011, ch.6). 
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everyone as equals, cannot propose laws 
or policies that will be in contrast with 
the idea that citizens are free and equal 
in the sense that they are free to form 
their conception of the good and that 
this should be equally respected; also 
that she respects the fact of reasonable 
pluralism, and that she does not think 
that benefits and burdens should be dis-
tributed in fair terms where everyone 
can see herself as member of coopera-
tion.
But, still these values do not say 
which laws or policies should be enacted 
or which reasons are to be considered as 
public reasons before the deliberation. It 
is part of the process of democratic de-
liberation to try to articulate our reasons 
in context of these values and weighing 
them. This interpretation of public rea-
son requires that citizens accord a delib-
erative priority to those reasons that ap-
ply only to political values when they are 
discussing binding decisions. They will 
of course disagree about decisions, about 
which reason better justifies a decision, 
which value carries more weight on par-
ticular issues and which decision is more 
justified. But, by giving deliberative pri-
ority to reasons presented in terms of 
political values, they guarantee that they 
will give equal weight to the set of values 
they all share as citizens, and that major-
ity will not have power simply to base 
decisions on the values and reasons that 
place the interests of some association, 
no matter how numerous, above others. 
Thus, the main point of this proposition 
is that a certain notion of equality can go 
further into the political sphere. Namely, 
it can go further into the content of po-
litical deliberation on decisions.
It seems to me that the idea of a com-
munity is important for this argument. 
For some group of individuals to form a 
community something must be shared. 
It can not simply be an aggregation of 
individuals and their private desires. As 
Rawls says, well-ordered democracy is 
not a ‘private society’ in which institu-
tional arrangements are purely of instru-
mental value for individuals in pursuit 
of their private ends (Rawls, 1999, 457). 
For political society to form a communi-
ty there must be something that is shared 
among individuals and this fact must be 
manifested in their relationship. This set 
of shared ideals in plural liberal democ-
racies is the set of political values that 
define liberal democracy, and our rela-
tion, constitutive of such a community, 
is the relation of us as citizens and not of 
us as adherents to particular doctrines 
or associations. It is of equal importance 
that we manifest this relation in a certain 
context. The appropriate context for 
such a relation is the context of delibera-
tive decision-making where we make 
decisions that will bind all citizens. 
Manifesting our acceptance of these po-
litical values is also a crucial aspect of 
assurance that everyone will stick to 
these values even if they become the ma-
jority that can bring decisions that will 
violate our rights or make policies that 
will burden our exercise of liberal rights. 
In this way we truly constitute a political 
community through democratic assem-
bly and empower it with an inherent 
authority without the need for any kind 
of high court that safeguards our politi-
cal behavior. A high court, no matter 
how well justified, is always an agency 
added to cooperation while democratic 
assembly if constituted appropriately is a 
part of our political cooperation.9
Constraining argumentation in de-
mo cratic assembly by public reason is 
9 This is not an argument against an institu-
tion like a high court. I am just saying that 
we should try to give account of community 
without having in mind this institution. 
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certainly what Christiano calls a narrow 
conception of public deliberation de-
fined as the requirement that “citizens 
must advance proposals and the argu-
ments for them only on the basis of the 
shared fund of political ideas” (191). 
Christiano contrasts this conception with 
a conception he favors, a wider concep-
tion of public deliberation according to 
which “citizens debate and discuss pro-
posals for legislation and policy on the 
basis of arguments grounded in differing 
conceptions of justice and the common 
good and in different empirically ground-
 ed ideas about how society works” (190). 
What is important to note in first place is 
that the narrow view of deliberation I 
defend above, also allows arguments 
grounded in differing conceptions of 
justice as long as these conceptions are 
part of the general conception of liberal 
justice. But, certainly its constraints ap-
peal to controversial doctrines and ideas 
of the common good based solely on 
these doctrines. It seems, or at least I 
understand it that way, that the wide 
conception of deliberation allows such 
reasons and proposals, if they aim ra-
tionally, to persuade others, and if per-
sons proposing such reasons accept the 
force of a better argument. This wide 
conception of deliberation embodies 
many fundamental values – equal re-
spect, commitment to advancing justice 
and the common good; the public reali-
zation of equality. The narrow concep-
tion of deliberation, Christiano says, 
adds to these values a principle of rea-
sonableness or reciprocity. This is cer-
tainly correct, but as I claimed above, it 
seems to me that the narrow conception 
can be argued for in terms of relational 
equality as constitutive of community. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that manifesta-
tion of such a notion of equality is made 
through respecting the principle of rea-
sonableness.
Specifying these two conceptions of 
deliberation is not problematic for the 
view I endorse. On the contrary, to con-
tain both of these conceptions in differ-
ent domains of deliberation can serve as 
a valuable goal in democratic society. 
But, Christiano confronts these two con-
ceptions by saying that democracy can 
endorse either the wide conception or 
the narrow conception and he gives 
powerful arguments for refuting the 
narrow conception. His arguments 
against the narrow conception or more 
specifically, against the requirement of 
reasonableness as the demand that citi-
zens should appeal only to reasons that 
can be accepted by all are directed 
against three kinds of arguments for rea-
sonableness – epistemic, moral and 
democratic. His critique of two kinds of 
arguments – epistemic and democratic 
– I can accept without endangering the 
position outlined above. I do not think 
epistemic considerations should be ar-
guments for public reason, and I do not 
think that not respecting the boundaries 
of public reason violates democracy or 
makes someone a second-class citizen. 
But, refuting the moral argument in the 
way Christiano does presents a fatal 
blow to any position of that kind if plau-
sible. Thus, I will focus only on the mor-
al argument.
Christiano presents his moral argu-
ment for reasonableness in three steps: 
“First, everyone must respect each per-
son’s free exercise of her own reason. 
Second, in order to respect the free exer-
cise of each person’s reason, one must 
respect the products of her reason, in 
particular her reasonable comprehen-
sive doctrines. Third, in order to respect 
the products of each person’s reason, 
one must not require her to live in ways 
that are incompatible with their reason-
able comprehensive doctrine” (215-216). 
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Christiano then presents two fatal di-
lemmas for this argument. The first di-
lemma says “that the argument from re-
spect for reason either implies contro-
versial comprehensive doctrine or does 
not support the principle of reasonable-
ness.” The second dilemma says “that the 
argument either implies a need for com-
plete consensus or fails to establish the 
principle of reasonableness” (216). Let’s 
first focus on first dilemma. According 
to Christiano, this argument presuppos-
es a lexical superiority of respect for the 
free exercise of reason over other values, 
for example over epistemic values of a 
certain doctrine. Christiano then claims 
that “(t)he idea that the value of the free 
exercise of reason is lexically superior to 
all other values is a highly controversial 
claim” (217). Thus, by the standard of 
reasonableness it is not reasonable. The 
second part of the dilemma is equally 
problematic because “if the reasonable 
person takes account of differences in 
the epistemic reasonableness of compre-
hensive doctrines in establishing terms 
of association, then, the reasonable per-
son ought to advance the most reasona-
ble conception of value that she has” 
(218). But, I do not see why the demand 
for the priority of the free exercise of 
reason should be considered controver-
sial. To see this we should recall the 
problem we discussed at the beginning 
of the paper. The basis of equality is our 
equal dignity conferred on us because 
we have a capacity to engage with an in-
trinsic good, which Christiano calls hu-
manity. For many people the intrinsic 
good is articulated in the comprehensive 
doctrines to which they adhere. Many 
citizens will engage with intrinsic goods 
through some comprehensive doctrine 
– moral, philosophical or religious. At 
least, we are supposed to imagine that 
things will go that way. We have to make 
room for people to be committed to 
their comprehensive doctrines as well as 
to liberal justice. What this argument 
tells us is that we should not devise terms 
of associations that can make their ad-
herence to their reasonable comprehen-
sive doctrine harder solely on the 
grounds of other reasonable compre-
hensive doctrine. Respecting products 
of one’s reason does not mean that rea-
son produces all the values, but simply 
that someone’s acceptance of certain 
values or comprehensive doctrine is the 
product of the free exercise of reason. It 
simply means that we should not pro-
mote a certain reasonable, comprehen-
sive doctrine through our power as the 
authors of laws. Maybe I do not under-
stand well what it would mean to give 
priority to epistemic values over the free 
exercise of public reason, but it seems to 
me that there can be clear cases where 
epistemic values can endanger the free 
exercise of reason if we use them, I re-
peat, as the authors of laws. For example, 
should we epistemically question the 
Christian doctrine of the Trinity that 
many think is really irrational or the 
doctrine of God’s grace that says that 
grace is not based upon any reason at all, 
and yet it must be acknowledged to be 
just? Even though many can argue that 
these doctrines are on epistemically re-
ally shaky ground, persons must still be 
free to follow them. It seems to me that it 
would be inappropriate to invoke the ir-
rationality or rationality of such doc-
trines in our deliberation on laws and 
policies.
We can now see the second dilemma 
Christiano presents for reasonableness. 
The second dilemma says that either we 
need a complete consensus on principles 
of justice or reasonableness fails. Why 
do we need a complete consensus on 
principles of justice? Because according 
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to Christiano if “it is disrespectful to 
someone’s reason in requiring him or 
her to live in accordance to principles he 
or she does not accept” then it is also 
“disrespectful of this proponent’s reason 
to require her to forgo living in accord-
ance with principles she reasonably ac-
cepts (i.e., to forgo living in accordance 
with the whole truth as she sees it)” 
(218). Thus, the situation is symmetrical. 
If I propose a principle I hold to be just, 
but others reasonably reject it, and they 
accept the principle I reasonably reject, 
then I must live with the terms of associ-
ation that I reasonably regard as unjust. 
This situation Christiano calls a deliber-
ative impasse – “Either one must impose 
on one person terms that she does not 
accept or one must require another to 
live accordingly under terms that he re-
gards as fundamentally inadequate” (219). 
Again, the solution to this situation is to 
invoke the epistemic reasons and thus 
the requirement of reasonableness fails. 
But, my worry here is that I do not see 
this symmetry, and therefore I do not 
see the situation of a deliberative im-
passe. There is a difference between the 
criteria of reasonable rejection and rea-
sonable acceptance. So, according to the 
view I embrace no one can reasonably 
reject the general conception of justice 
or public equality. But the general con-
ception of justice contains a family of 
liberal conceptions of justice character-
ized by a set of political values. Proposals 
within this set presented in terms of po-
litical values are those that reasonable 
persons reasonably accept even though 
they do not hold that all of them equally 
just. Every proposal within this set that 
the majority votes for is reasonably ac-
ceptable to everyone. So, I do not see 
how anyone can hold this proposal as 
fundamentally inadequate or funda-
mentally unjust even though she reason-
ably rejects it in favor of another propos-
al. On the other hand, if the person holds 
this particular proposal as fundamental-
ly inadequate on the basis of her reasons 
coming from her comprehensive doc-
trine, then she is appealing to reasons 
that are part of a different kind of disa-
greement to influence a political deci-
sion that is in the domain of another 
kind of disagreement. The first kind of 
disagreement is a disagreement at the 
fundamental level about the good life, 
where no common evaluative standard 
exists in plural societies, while the sec-
ond kind of disagreement is a narrower 
political disagreement where there is 
supposed to be a common standard of 
liberal justice and political values. A per-
son who disregards this is violating the 
requirement of reciprocity and is placing 
her interests above the interests of oth-
ers. Let us look at an example of this in 
the debate on the public financing of 
stem-cell research. Research in stem-cell 
biology gives us well supported hope 
that we will be able to heal people with 
serious cardiovascular or neurological 
issues. On the other hand, this research 
includes the in vitro fertilization of a 
human egg and destroying it (in the 
form of a blastocyst) three to five days 
later. Current Catholic doctrine opposes 
such research because they believe that 
the blastocyst is ensouled from the mo-
ment of conception and has equal nor-
mative moral status as any other human 
person. According to the view defended 
here, if the debate on financing stem-cell 
research takes place in a public political 
forum then it must be within the bound-
aries of public reason, and the justifica-
tion of financing such research must be 
based on public reasons or political val-
ues. The demand for health or the de-
mand for the normal development of 
capabilities and the avoidance of disabil-
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ity cannot be dismissed as irrelevant for 
questions of justice as certain tastes and 
preferences often are. These demands 
can be understood as the reasonable de-
mands for goods that every person needs 
to be able to form, revise and rationally 
pursue its rational plan of life or as part 
of political value of fair equality of op-
portunity. On the other hand, belief in 
ensoulment can be translated in the po-
litical value of due protection of human 
life, which is an important value that we 
can expect every reasonable citizen to 
accept. So, the debate can be within the 
boundaries of public reason. Thus, the 
decision to stop stem-cell research 
would mean giving excessive weight to 
the due respect we owe human life in 
contrast to the weight of some primary 
goods or the fair equality of opportunity. 
To justify the special weight assigned to 
the due respect for human life in this 
context, would bring in a nonpublic val-
ue or belief that a blastocyst has a 
non-overridable right to life from the 
moment of conception. This belief about 
the moral status of blastocyst is not a 
belief that all reasonable citizens accept. 
It would be wrong to deprive people of 
some good or diminish a certain politi-
cal value on the basis of the belief that we 
cannot reasonably expect what these 
persons can accept. So, the reason why 
the belief in ensoulment is not consid-
ered to be public reason is because it 
cannot be a shared reason in a pluralistic 
society and not because it is not, for ex-
ample, evidentially supported or because 
it is epistemologically flawed.
If the decision were to be made on 
the grounds of such a belief than it 
would imply that we give more weight to 
an interest that is not in the set of shared 
interests of our political community, and 
that we give more weight to values of 
one of particular community existing in 
society. On the other hand, when the 
person who holds the belief in ensoul-
ment at the moment of conception loses 
in a political discussion constrained by 
political values, she cannot say that some 
other narrow moral community won. 
What happened is that the majority 
holds that some values, which she also 
accepts, carry more weight in the politi-
cal community of which she is also a 
part as a reasonable citizen. It seems to 
me that these two cases are not symmet-
rical. Of course stem-cell research is one 
of the hard cases. We can imagine many 
other cases that can be more easily pre-
sented in terms of political values. 
Christiano’s example is the choice of the 
principle of the distribution of employ-
ment. There are many principles for the 
distribution of employment – according 
to desert, efficiency or the maximization 
of the economic position of the least ad-
vantaged. All of these three principles 
can be presented by referring to political 
values only – which principle, for exam-
ple better satisfies the freedom of occu-
pation, social cooperation or fairness. 
They can include a discussion, for exam-
ple, on how fair it is that someone was 
luckier to have marketable talents; or if 
desert is a necessary part of considering 
citizens freedom to choose their occupa-
tion; how will the principle of desert or 
efficiency distribute burdens and bene-
fits on the least-advantaged if they are 
considered to be participants of social 
cooperation. Then there can be debate 
on empirical grounds for certain claims 
or propositions. Therefore, if the person 
who regards the desert-based approach 
as fully just, loses in the political game 
because the majority votes for principle 
of efficiency. For example, she lost on the 
basis of the political values she accepts as 
a citizen of liberal democracy. She can-
not say that any principle chosen in this 
way is fully unjust.
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This is not an argument against 
every possible situation of a deliberative 
impasse. An impasse can occur because, 
for example, which solution presents the 
best balance of political values will be 
indeterminate, and the problem can be 
presented solely in terms of political val-
ues. There are number of ways to deal 
with this situation, and I will not discuss 
them here.10 I just want to argue that it is 
not so likely that the situation of a delib-
erative impasse will occur simply ac-
cording to citizens’ deliberative priority 
towards political values and public rea-
sons.
The aim of this discussion about the 
moral argument for reasonableness is 
only to show that the narrow conception 
of deliberation is feasible and not inco-
herent. The aim is not to defend the nar-
row conception of deliberation over the 
wide conception of deliberation. Con-
trary to Christiano, I do not think that 
these two conceptions of deliberation 
exclude each other. We do not have to 
choose between two ideas of democracy 
– one that is reasonable or narrow and 
one that is open to various other grounds 
for argumentation or wide. I do not see a 
problem of having an idea of a demo-
cratic society where these two concep-
tions of deliberation apply to different 
spheres. One, narrow conception, ap-
plies to a particular sphere of democratic 
society – the narrowly political sphere 
that includes deliberation will necessari-
ly end with binding political decision. 
The second, wider conception, refers to 
the wider notion of democratic society 
where we engage in deliberation with 
others, discuss political or nonpolitical 
issues that do not necessarily end with 
10 This problem is discussed by Andrew Wil-
liams (2000), Micah Schwartzman (2004) 
and Elvio Baccarini (2015, ch. 1).
the enforcement of the outcome of our 
decision. This wider deliberation in-
cludes citizen debates, opinion journal-
ism, political art, expressions of various 
kinds, and many other activities orient-
ed towards rationally persuading others 
in the correctness or truth of one’s view. 
Of course, it is hard to divide informal 
political deliberation and formal politi-
cal deliberation, but it is also hard to 
deny that this division exists. Political 
speeches to a wider audience from state 
officials, or political advertising in cam-
paigns are gray areas, but nevertheless 
the official decision-making of legisla-
tors that results in laws is certainly the 
clearest example of narrow political de-
liberation, which is outside of this infor-
mal political sphere. In this informal 
political sphere we certainly need more 
open discussion and argumentation on 
other grounds than in formal political 
discussion. Every comprehensive view 
must be open and possibly scrutinized 
in order for basic interests of the individ-
uals to be advanced. These basic inter-
ests are: “the interest in correcting for 
cognitive bias, the interest in being at 
home in the world, the interest in learn-
ing the truth, and the interest in being 
recognized and affirmed as equal” (200). 
In order to advance these interests, espe-
cially the first three, individuals must be 
free from any constraint except the will-
ingness to listen to others and to reply to 
others.11 In this sphere they can question 
each other’s doctrines on epistemic 
grounds. For example, in the issue of 
stem-cell research raised above, this do-
main is the appropriate domain for 
questioning the epistemic reasonable-
ness of the doctrine of ensoulment at the 
11 There can also be certain restrictions of 
time, place and manner of speech. Also, 
many countries have regulations about hate 
speech.
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moment of conception. Here we can, for 
example, describe a mechanism of early 
human ontogeny in enough detail to 
raise puzzles about the exact stage at 
which “ensoulment” must occur.12 We 
can question this belief also from histor-
ic grounds. This belief occurred in 17th 
century when fertilized ova appeared 
through primitive microscopes to re-
semble perfectly formed people. Ac-
cording to Aquinas’ teaching, the soul 
enters when the human shape is formed. 
Thus, the conclusion was that it happens 
at the moment of fertilization.13 But, as 
our understanding of human embryolo-
gy progressed, scientists began to realize 
that this view of fetal development was 
wrong. The Catholic Church, however, 
never abandoned its policy, although it 
is based on empirically flawed data. This 
can clearly be an argument used in the 
debate among citizens. But at the formal 
political level there is no need to trespass 
on each other’s doctrines in this way.
But why would this sphere be impor-
tant if it is through laws and policies that 
citizens arrange their common world? 
Well, the point is that it is not only 
through laws and policies that our com-
mon social world is arranged. Our com-
mon world and the society we share is in 
important ways also arranged by how 
our co-citizens use their liberal rights, 
what associations they make and how 
they express their adherence to their 
conceptions of the good or comprehen-
sive doctrines. Christiano also says that 
“(l)iberal rights give people the power to 
12  This argument is presented by Phillip Kitch-
er in (Kitcher, 2011, 235). 
13 This history of belief in insoulment from the 
moment of conception is taken from James 
Rachels in (Rachels, 2003, 61). St. Thomas 
Aquinas thought that embryo does not have 
a soul untill few weeks into pregnancy be-
cause then fertilized ova gets human shape.
organize their relations with other peo-
ple and thereby give them some power 
over other people” (134). Thereby, it is 
not so clear that liberal rights confer 
power on people to shape only their in-
dividual lives because by arranging their 
private lives and the lives of their associ-
ations they clearly arrange the common 
world and the society we all share. It in-
fluences the environment and atmos-
phere in which we will live our lives. 
Society can in this way, for example, be 
and look religious without in any official 
and governmental sense being religious 
by state sponsored religions. A certain 
kind of traditional ethos can prevail and 
appear in everyday life without being 
prescribed by law or promoted by cer-
tain policies. And if this is the case then 
I do not see why this same kind of par-
ticular values should also be promoted 
by official legislation. By demanding the 
narrow conception of deliberation in the 
formal, political sphere of direct law-
making we realize a public good of as-
surance in that the laws we make will be 
the expression of the liberal conception 
of justice and not the expression of oth-
ers’ opinion on our comprehensive doc-
trine or the lives we lead. It is the infor-
mal sphere where we are expected to say 
these kinds of judgments on each other, 
and every democratic society welcomes 
this sphere to be vibrant and lively. Par-
ticularly, if we allow the freedom of ex-
pression, which besides rational argu-
ment also includes ridiculing, intention-
al blasphemy and the expression of anti 
egalitarian attitudes, then it is clear why 
the formal political sphere should be a 
sphere which will assure us that laws will 
not be based on such premises.
When I talk about an assurance of 
this kind I believe it is also connected to 
the legitimacy of democratic assembly. 
Democratic assembly according to 
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Christiano is properly constituted when 
“the representatives in the assembly have 
been elected in the proper way in a pro-
cess of election that includes all sane 
permanent adult residents of the socie-
ty” (246). It is the most important part of 
representative or electoral democracy 
and it further requires “a system of party 
list proportional representation coupled 
with an egalitarian system of financing 
of political parties and an egalitarian 
process of discussion among the differ-
ent interest groups and pressure groups 
in the society” (246). So, if the demo-
cratic assembly is properly constituted 
then all citizens have the rights to an 
equal say and they have an institutional 
method by which they exercise these 
rights. This confers to democratic as-
sembly a legitimate authority as a right 
to rule. Also, as we saw, it constitutes a 
political community. It is certainly true 
that a properly constituted democratic 
assembly fulfills this role, and I agree 
that representative democracy is the best 
way to realize public equality in large 
scale, plural societies. But, there are 
many empirical findings that put doubt 
on the belief that input side and fair pro-
cedures are the main pillars for creating 
political legitimacy. Bo Rothstein, for 
example, reports a paradox that trust in 
representative democratic institutions is 
decreasing in well-established, peaceful 
and rich democracies like the Scandina-
vian countries, but that still people ac-
cept the legitimacy of its laws.14 Part of 
the answer is that citizens are able to 
differentiate between the representation 
and the implementation side of the dem-
ocratic system. The level of trust is high-
er when it comes to the so called imple-
mentation side of politics than is the 
14 Rothstein discusses this issue in Rothstein 
(2011, ch. 4).  
case with the representational side. Also, 
what is surprising is that persistent cul-
tural minorities in many EU countries 
(Swedish-speaking minority in Finland, 
German-speaking minority in Den-
mark) who do not believe they will ever 
prevail in some future elections, have 
higher levels of trust in their govern-
ments than national or linguistic major-
ities. Now, I am not saying that we can 
make some big conclusions from these 
reports. Primarily because the social 
sciences use different notions of legiti-
macy referring to the popular support of 
laws and institutions while political phi-
losophers refer to legitimacy in its nor-
mative meaning. But nevertheless it can 
speak in favor of the view that holds that 
for legitimate authority it is not enough 
to ensure only equal rights, equal say 
and fair procedures to give legitimate 
authority. It can speak in favor of the 
need to give an account of a further ele-
ment for legitimacy, and that is on what 
basis political decisions are made. 
Namely, if a number of citizens see 
themselves primarily as addressees of 
laws and have doubts that they are truly 
the authors of laws then we must have a 
set of values on which those laws are 
grounded that we expect citizens as ad-
dressees would accept. Laws are still 
made in their name. Public reason as a 
narrow conception of deliberation pro-
vides an assurance that even if demo-
cratic assemblies are not perfectly con-
stituted they will still have outcomes that 
when implemented will be a realization 
of the values that citizens as the address-
es of these laws can be reasonably ex-
pected to accept. If the trust in institu-
tions strengthens norms of civic trust 
then public reason helps to strengthen 
these ties and make our political com-
munity more stable.
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Javna jednakost, javni um i liberalna zajednica
SAŽETAK U svojoj knjizi The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and its Limits 
Christiano brani gledište da demokracija ima autoritet zato jer ostvaruje javnu jednakost. 
Za realiziranje javne jednakosti, prema Christianu, nije potrebno nikakvo ograničenje koje 
se odnosi na sadržaj razloga koje nudimo jedni drugima kada opravdavamo zakone i 
javne politke. U ovom članku pokušavam pokazati da postoje dobri razlozi zašto ograni-
čenja javnog uma mogu doprinijeti dubljoj realizaciji javne jednakosti u pluralnom druš-
tvu te također pokušavam obraniti to gledište od nekih kritika koje je ponudio Christiano 
u svojoj knjizi.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI demokracija, javni um, javna jednakost, Thomas Christiano
